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Abstract 
 
Malicious code is a threat to computer systems 
globally. In this paper, we outline the evolution of 
malicious code attacks. The threat is evolving, leaving 
challenges for attackers to improve attack techniques 
and for researchers and security specialists to improve 
detection accuracy. We present a novel architecture 
for an effective defense against malicious code attack, 
inspired by the human immune system. We introduce 
two phases of program execution: Adolescent and 
Mature Phase. The first phase uses a malware profile 
matching mechanism, whereas the second phase uses a 
program profile matching mechanism. Both 
mechanisms are analogous to the innate immune 
system. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
All The term Malicious Code (MC) refers to threats 
posed from code execution that cause damage or 
render the system security useless. MC can be 
categorized into virus, worm, logic bomb, trojan horse, 
germ, exploit, downloader, dialer, dropper, injector, 
auto-rooter, virus generator spammer program, flooder, 
key logger, rootkit and spyware[15, 4]. 
In this paper, we present a novel architecture for an 
effective defense against malicious code attack called 
MaCDI. The next section presents the current evolving 
threats, as a research motivation. Section three 
provides brief explanations to problems in the existing 
solutions. Section four explores the Human Immune 
System (HIS) that is gaining its momentum since 
several years ago. Section five describes our 
architecture in depth. Before the conclusion, we 
outline several case studies on how our idea could fit 
to a number of situations. 
 
2. The Evolving Threat 
 
All Malicious code has gone through a number of 
stages[4] as computers have evolved, from exploiting 
sector 0 of floppy disks to spreading through email 
contacts in attached files. Malware is also embedded 
into executable files, some of them targeting files in 
shared directories. Macro viruses target word 
processing software, which people use to work with 
their documents. The distribution of these documents 
has simultaneously triggered the spread of the viruses. 
Email also became a medium of propagation with 
infected files sent as attachments to other machines. 
Dubious and legitimate but hacked websites become 
the target for malware distribution via the installation 
of plug-ins or java applets. Embedded malicious code 
also exists in free-to-download files such as system 
utilities and screensavers.  
CD and DVD disks can execute programs 
automatically upon insertion of the disk. When a CD-
ROM drive's autorun property is set to enable, an 
inserted CD/DVD containing malicious content can 
cause a computer to be fully compromised. USB is a 
popular medium for personal file transfer and backup 
because it is small, reliable and handy. A modified 
USB with U3 technology makes one part of the USB 
being detected as a CD-ROM. Some modifications will 
allow full customization on what application will 
execute upon insertion of the USB into a USB port[1]. 
Worm propagation does not require user interaction. 
Malicious code can directly target hosts, while others 
target software vulnerability. A vulnerable machine 
also faces arbitrary code injection using exploits.  
There have been a number of disastrous malware 
attacks, such as Code Red, Code Red II, Melissa, 
Witty, Nachi, Santy, SQL.Slammer and MyDoom[4]. 
These threats demand faster detection of unknown 
attacks and an ability to immunize computers affected 
by the first wave of attacks. 
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3. Present Solutions To The Problems 
 
Many researchers have attempted solutions such as 
checksum, heuristic, integrity shell, string checker, 
system call tracing, machine emulators, logic analyzers 
and network sniffers[4, 10]. The checksum technique 
uses a mathematical algorithm to extract a digital 
signature from the file contents. If the file contents 
changes, there is a very high probability that the 
checksum will no longer match. However, it only 
provides change detection and is not feasible for 
frequently updated files. The heuristic is an approach 
that analyzes based on a rule of thumb, and although 
popular, is susceptible to code obfuscation and direct 
attacks. The integrity shell method checks for 
alteration evidence. This technique is only suitable for 
managing read-only files such as application's DLLs. 
The string checker method reads binary data in files, 
looking for known signatures. This technique assumes 
that malicious code always shares the same or similar 
binary patterns, since most viruses use a limited 
number of attack techniques. Unfortunately, this 
technique is vulnerable to viruses presenting with a 
new binary pattern. It is also slow and only able to 
detect known signatures. Thus, frequent signature 
update is required. A machine emulator is suitable for 
tracing the effect of a suspicious program. At the end 
of the execution, files are compared with their state 
before the execution takes place. However this 
technique requires traversing and checking every 
single path code. A logic analyzer captures every 
single instruction of a traced process. This information 
may help to identify harmful instructions. Using a 
network sniffer, also known as protocol analyzer or 
packet sniffer, is a technique to defend computer 
network against several kind of attacks. For instance, it 
could be possible when some attacks generate similar 
traffic pattern over time or matches the existing attack 
signatures. However, a slight modification could 
change the attack pattern. Encrypted packet payload is 
also difficult to reveal. 
The software certification is a solution for 
Microsoft applications and third party vendor 
applications[9]. However, this technique is not feasible 
in terms of cost, especially for small organizations or 
non-profit organizations, because not all software 
houses or programmers can afford to bear the cost. 
Alternatively, hardening the operating system (OS) 
code can avoid malicious exploitation of system files 
and resources. Disabling executable and scripting will 
ensure no MC can run. However, this solution is 
largely infeasible, as applications will have fewer 
capabilities available to them. Furthermore, many 
legacy applications will fail to run with a significantly 
disabled Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) 
on the OS. 
There are a number of other popular 
implementations for malware detection. Automatic 
patch generation architecture[14] counters worm 
attacks by using a number of sensors to capture 
potential attack vectors. Suspicious vectors are tested 
against instrumented applications in a sandbox 
environment and vulnerability exploits are identified. 
Using a heuristic technique, the best patch is updated 
to the actual server. This architecture is susceptible to 
attacks that cause unnecessary patch generations. 
Sandboxed environments[8] isolate code execution 
in an isolated area. This technique requires application 
customization to allow it to be sandboxed. Virtual 
machines are a form of sandboxed systems. The 
problem of using this is at least two OSs need to run. 
Furthermore, it is infeasible to determine which code 
caused a virus, as time-delayed viruses could wait until 
a later date to deliver their destructive payload. 
Real-time analysis can be used to detect worms[12], 
where packet payload is read to look for repetitive 
packet patterns. It is assumed that Internet worms tend 
to send the same packet repetitively to the same host. 
This technique however is susceptible to customized 
attacks that hide the patterns, and is also only 
applicable to worms. 
System call tracing or API hooking is a technique 
that looks for the use of APIs, trapping calls invoked 
by each application. Forrest et al. [6] fragmented long 
system calls into several shorter system calls signature. 
We follow this approach and refine the signatures so 
that signatures, which are not harmful, can be 
removed, thus reducing the size of our malware 
profile. Yangfang et al. [16] recorded all system calls 
attempts and generated system calls signature to 
contains detailed information about the process which 
also include the total number of called functions made 
by the process. In [9] they monitored several potential 
APIs used by malicious code such as registry, file 
system, scripting host, system and communication 
APIs. Changes made by programs are tracked and 
recorded, to be undone should malicious API calls be 
detected. 
 
4. Human Immune System 
 
The mechanisms of the Human Immune System 
(HIS) have inspired many researchers to adapt similar 
characteristics in computer defense[2]. A newborn 
baby does not have a developed immunity, but 
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depends on the thymus that carries inherited immunity 
from the mother. 
In HIS, B cells are white blood cells that play a 
large role in the humoral immune response whereas T-
cells have roles in the cell-mediated immune response, 
also known as innate immune system. The major task 
performed by B cells is to make antibodies. 
A variety of T-cells, Natural Killer (NK) cells, 
recognize a pathogen when the cell's Major 
Histocompatibility Complex (MHC) shown on its 
surface is detected as non-self. Damaged or infected 
cells tend show unusual level of MHC. 
Forrest et al. [6] adapted this idea for their self-non-
self theory. Benign cells may show low volume of 
MHC due to reasons such as the cells is too old or 
damaged. NK bring these cells to lysis (repair) or 
apoptosis (dismantle for complete safe destruction). 
NK cells are cell killers, activated when they 
receive one of the following signals: 
• Cytokines: A stressed cell may release uric acid to 
inhibit a pathogen that is entering through its cell 
wall. NK cells detect this acid and respond against 
pathogen situated at the surrounding area of the cell. 
Matzinger's Danger Theory[13] adapted this process. 
• FC-Receptor: At site the of infection, a large 
number of white cells engulfs pathogens and repairs 
infected cells. 
• Activating and inhibitory receptors: NK has 
receptors that connect to nearby cells. These 
receptors regulate cells destruction activities. 
The defense of HIS inspired many researchers to 
adapt similar characteristics in computer security. 
There are several models of self and non-self[3]. 
Pioneering works by Forrest et al. [6, 5] used the 
nature of the peptides to allow the differentiation 
between self and non-self. The input vector is 
analogous to the peptide. Using the negative selection 
algorithm, there are two stages involved: generation 
stage and detection stage. In the generation stage, a 
normal profile is recorded with the assumption that 
there are no intrusive activities. Once the normal 
profile is sufficiently developed, a raw vector is passed 
to a process with the aim to match the self-sample. A 
matching self-sample (normal vector) will be discarded 
and the remaining vectors (abnormal) will be passed to 
a detector. In the detection stage, the detector uses 
recorded attack vectors to compare with the incoming 
vectors. Any matching pattern is considered 
anomalous. 
There are a number of other research studies 
including [11, 7] which attempted to explore the 
mapping ideas between malicious code detection and 
Danger Theory. In [11], the authors adopted the 
functionality of dendritic cells (DCs). It begins with 
DCs forwarding a collected protein (antigen) together 
with its environmental context to effector T cells. 
When passed to the lymph node, DCs display antigen 
with context signals. T cells that have a complimentary 
receptor for the antigen are activated for immunization. 
If a cell is stressed because danger is present within a 
particular tissue, nearby DCs will produce 
inflammatory cytokine. Then, the cell will undergo 
lysis or apoptosis. Additionally, they included the idea 
of pattern recognition receptors, which available on 
dendritic cells. These receptors can detect certain well-
known pathogens like bacteria that have particular 
proteins called pathogen associated molecular patterns 
(PAMPs). The known protein is learnt over long time. 
In their work, the PAMP can be assumed as security 
policy violation. Safe Signal is the same as normal 
behavior. The danger signal is equivalent to a harmful 
symptom such as a sharp spike in memory or CPU 
processes. Cytokine is equivalent to the system load 
average that can change as a result of one or more 
symptoms. Antigen is regarded as exploited system 
calls. 
 
5. System architecture 
 
Our proposed malicious code detection solution 
encompasses the human immune system. We are 
interested in pattern recognition using vectors derived 
from system calls rather than from the code signature 
itself, as suggested by Forrest et al. [6, 5]. Figure 1 
illustrates general components in our proposed 
solution. 
Malware Profile
MalwareRunning Executable
Quarantine & Signature 
Generation
Profile Builder
Scanner
Related logs
Program Profile 
Classifier
  
Figure 1. MaCDI general components 
 
Demonstrating the feature of the thymus that 
provides immunity for a newborn baby, we create a 
malware profile of the actions of existing viruses. This 
is created by running as many existing viruses as 
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possible within a test bed to collect API call patterns. 
Refinement of the profile is crucial so as to reduce the 
profile size and the profile matching overhead. Thus a 
collection of common user applications on a specific 
platform are then executed to filter out non-malware 
API calls patterns. The result is a malware profile of 
common API calls sequences used primarily in MC. 
Our proposed detection model consists of two 
phases: the Adolescent Phase and the Mature Phase, 
corresponding to the innate and acquired immune 
response, respectively. Each program must separately 
and independently partake in these two phases. 
 
Match Against 
Malware Profile
A Running 
Program
Build Up Program 
Profile
Quarantine Fileyes
No
Generate Hash 
File
Scan Related 
Directories
 
Figure 2. Processes in adolescent phase 
 
Every newly installed program enters the 
Adolescent Phase (see Figure 2). In this phase all 
system calls that it invokes are monitored and 
compared with the malware profile. If a call matches a 
number of patterns, execution will be terminated and 
the executable code will be quarantined. The 
quarantined executable's API call patterns can further 
be analyzed to update the malware profile, however 
this research is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Furthermore, the binary code signature of the MC is 
recorded. In a step similar to current anti-virus 
programs, the Scanner is activated to perform a 
cleanup operation at the next scan interval. The 
signature obtained from the matched executable is used 
by the signature-based Scanner to scan for the same 
files in related directories. Files that are found will be 
quarantined. This allows further removal of the same 
MC before it is executed. This process is analogous to 
the adaptive immune system 
If, on the other hand, there is no match between the 
new running program and the malware profile, a 
program profile will be built. A program profile is a 
smaller profile than the larger malware profile of all 
malicious code call patterns. A program profile is 
simply the usual API pattern calls for a given 
application after a significant amount of usage time 
and usage spread of the executable code base. The 
program will move from Adolescent Phase to Mature 
Phase when its program profile becomes mature, 
which depends on the following rules: 
• The amount of time the program has been running 
cumulatively. 
• The spread of an application's code which has been 
executed. Naturally not all code within an 
application will ever run, but the more code which is 
run the greater the size variable. 
• The number of failed attempts to add a new system 
call pattern exceeds a threshold. This means that 
harvesting a new pattern is already too exhaustive. 
Once an application has entered the Mature Phase, 
MaCDI no longer performs API comparing with the 
full malware profile nor does the program profile get 
updated. Consider this analogy: a person meets new 
people each day. As that person forms a longer 
relationship, and the spread of situations that the two 
are involved in increases (i.e. the more aspects of the 
other's life a person witnesses), the more a person is 
trusted.Once a person is trusted, they are in the Mature 
Phase. Less checking is done on them and more trust is 
placed on them to execute potentially dangerous 
actions (such as giving them a spare key to a house, 
etc). If the person starts behaving differently from 
expected, then more awareness is placed on them and 
they become less trusted again. Naturally, someone 
trusted could still do person harm to a person, and the 
same applies to applications, which are in the Mature 
Phase. All that can be done in this case is to roll back 
damaged files where possible and manually repair 
other damage (such as MC utilizing an email address 
list to propagate the viral payload to others). 
There would be cases where a legitimate program 
installed by a user is deemed as malicious, where the 
software vendor even declares that their software 
product has malware behaviors. Such programs are 
often related to hacking and penetration tools. The end 
user may manually put a program into the Mature 
Phase at their own risk. 
 
Match Against 
Program Profile
A Running 
Program
Switch to 
Adolescent Phase
Allow ExecutionYes
No
 
Figure 3. Processes in mature phase 
 
Any program that survives the Adolescent Phase is 
expected to enter the Mature Phase eventually 
(provided the application is continually used, and not a 
run-once case). In this phase (see Figure 3), the 
program will undergo system call checking every time 
it is run. The system calls it makes are considered 
anomalous when an invocation pattern deviates from 
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the pattern stored in the program profile, at which 
point it drops back to the Adolescent Phase and the 
newly executed code runs through the full malware 
profile again. 
The occurrence of the deviation can be assumed as 
the appearance of the uric acid on stressed cells. This 
process conforms to the process of NK cells 
recognizing a pathogen when the cell's fragmented 
peptides shown on its surface are detected as non-self. 
If in the Adolescent Phase the executable detected as 
malware, it will be quarantined. The Scanner is 
activated to perform a clean up operation at the next 
scan interval. If it is not a malware activity, the Profile 
Builder will add the pattern into its existing program 
profile. 
Changes and deletion on files are logged. A file 
deletion will cause the file to be backed up first. If the 
delete operation is not part of a malware pattern, the 
backup copy is also deleted otherwise the file is 
restored. We propose the use of a versioning file 
system as an underlying format for disks. A versioning 
file system uses a copy-on-write approach to file 
modification. It stores the original content of files for a 
certain period so that unwanted changes can be rolled 
back. Newer operating systems today offer such 
similar technology (Shadow Copy is available in all 
releases of Microsoft Windows since Windows XP 
SP1. Mac OS X Leopard has Time Machine), which 
makes rollback after MC has executed trivial. 
Performing backup can also slow down computer 
performance. We prioritize backup of those files into 
three lists where lower rank files may not be backed up 
if computer performance is downgraded. They are: 
User Files (Top Critical): This list contains files 
created by the user using any application. Losing these 
files causes loss of intellectual property, as they cannot 
be replaced, unless other copies exist. In our analogy 
of the human body, this corresponds to the loss of a 
person's mind. 
OS Files (Medium Critical): These files are essential 
to the operation of the computer. If the damage cannot 
be repaired, the OS and applications need to be re-
installed. This is analogous to critical cells in the 
human body, such as brain, stem cells etc., where 
damage may cause death or catastrophic illness. 
Application Files (Low Critical): This list contains 
applications that are installed or stored in the 
computer. Losing these files interferes with the 
application functionality, but not with the OS. These 
are analogous to the cells that form muscle, skin, bone 
etc. Damage to these cells may cause permanent 
disability to the affected. 
MaCDI is a generic model for platform-independent 
computer defense against malicious code attack. We 
suggest that a detected malicious behavior of an 
executable will cause it be quarantined. There are also 
some executables used to run some executables and 
script files. MaCDI monitors executables and also 
identifies the script file that is executed. A detected 
malicious activity on the executable will cause the 
script file to be quarantined. 
 
6. From Theory to Case Study 
 
A program that performs malicious activities can be 
detected as early as its first run in the Adolescent 
Phase, when system calls made are compared with 
malware profile. Some programs may start showing its 
dangerous behavior at a certain point of time. It is 
unusual for a normal program to have malign features 
such as key logging, downloading executables and 
mass mailing unless it is installed for that purpose. The 
detection occurs at the time the malicious pattern 
starts. Some programs may start showing their 
malicious behavior in the second phase. The 
executable program will be quarantined, and any 
affected files will be restored to their original 
condition. The Scanner extracts a code signature from 
the file and uses it to scan the related directories of the 
program at the next scan interval. Files associated with 
the program will be marked for quarantine. If the 
program does not match malicious activities during 
running, its API call patterns will be updated in the 
program profile. 
A matured program is allowed to perform the API 
call sequences, which have been recorded in its 
program profile. If the mature program then begins 
performing API call sequences which are outside its 
usual pattern, further API calls will be checked against 
the complete malware profile. If, perchance, modifying 
files has been recorded and allowed in the program 
profile (e.g. a word processor saves files which it first 
loads), then this action will be undetected and only 
human action can flag a potential virus. Whether or not 
malicious code can be constructed to not deviate from 
a program profile and the amount of information 
stored in the program profile is a subject of impending 
work. 
 
7. Challenges and Conclusion 
 
There are vast resources in the Internet open for 
malicious code writers to take advantage of any 
opportunities to craft their new malware. When new 
malware is created, as long it has the behavior as 
already known in the malware profile, the malware 
execution would be detected. 
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In this paper, we introduce our novel architecture 
for an effective solution against malicious code attack. 
Inspired by HIS, MaCDI proposes to detect malware 
even though the malware has not been detected earlier, 
by looking at similar patterns to system calls. The 
challenges of our architecture are:  
1. The ability to learn and anticipate the next 
completely new malware behavior that lies beyond 
detection of MaCDI. Profiling the first variant of a 
next generation malware possibly overcomes the 
problem. 
2. Minimizing the impact on the computer performance 
while hooking up the OS files to obtain as many 
relevant system calls as possible. Unhooking 
selected API on OS processes could be the solution 
as we assume those processes are clean until 
desirable performance is achieved. However, the 
assumption can be wrong when using pirated copy 
or modified installer. Together with an optimized 
classifier, the reduction of malware profile and 
program profile can also enhance MaCDI 
performance. 
3. Minimizing the impact on the computer performance 
while backing up files. To overcome that we could 
also prioritize files that need back up. 
In future work, we will model and test the classifier 
to be used for obtaining matches between the profiles 
and the executable. At the end of our experiment we 
will attempt to answer the following questions: 
1. Can system calls signature detect more viruses than 
binary code signatures? 
2. Are system calls signatures smaller than binary code 
signatures? 
3. Does combining both system calls and code 
signatures result in better detection (i.e. more viruses 
detected)? 
4. Are fragments of system calls signature better for 
detecting viruses than using the whole signature? 
What fragment length works best? 
5. Are there viruses we cannot get system calls 
signature for? 
6. Can a virus creator (hacker) find a way around the 
system calls based detector? 
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